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IN TI!E SUPREtlE COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CARNA L. PETERSON, by LARRY
BROADHEAD, guardian,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
DAVID H. CARTER and JANET
S. CARTER,

Case No. 15,310

Defendants-Respondents,
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICE,
Intervenor.
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a suit in equity to vacate a deed brought by
the guardian of Carna Peterson, an incompetent person, on
the basis of said person's incompetency and on the basis of
undue influence exercised over her by the defendants-respondents (hereinafter referred to as respondents).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court held a trial on the merits and found
that Carna Peterson knew and understood the nature of the
transaction, the lien position of the State of Utah, and the
consequential limitation on the benefits to be derived by
her for the sale of the property, and that respondents did
not exercise any undue influence, fraud or duress over Carna
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Peterson when acquiring the subject property.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek to have this Court make a complete
review of the facts as revealed by the record and to reverse
the trial court's findings, and to have the case remanded to
the lower court for trial on the issues of the right of the
respondents to receive reimbursement for improvements done
on the property.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
By warranty deed dated September 2, 1975,

(Ex. 3),

Carna Peterson conveyed her home and underlying real property of approximately 1 acre located in Juab County, State
of Utah, to the respondents for the sum of $3,200.00.

Prior

to this time, by an instrument entitled "Bill of Sale" dated
the 29th day of August, 197 2,

(Ex. 2) , the respondents tried

to purchase the same home and property for the same price,
but were frustrated in their attempts to do so.
At the time of the execution of the warranty deed,
Carna Peterson was 91 years of age and was residing in a
rest home since she was unable to care for herself.
to this

ti~e,

Prior

the State of Utah had recorded a welfare lien

against the property in excess of $28,000.00, (Ex. 8),

whi~

was released by an instrument dated the 8th of Septemberr
1975.

(Ex. 6).
Sometime around September 8, 1975, the attorney for the

respondents, Milton Harmon, received a phone call from

LeR~

Jackson, the attorney for Mrs. Peterson's family, objecting
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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to the tcansaction, and questioning Ncs. Petecson's competency.

(R. 91-92).

On the 13th day of November, 1975, Larcy Broadhead was
duly appointed the guardian of the person and estate of
Carna L. Petecson, and on November 22, 1975, by his attorney
Jackson Howard, he notified the respondents of the family's
intent to vacate the deed, demanding reconveyance of the
propecty.

(Ex. 7).

This suit was then instituted against the respondents
around the 19th of December, 1975, with the appellants
alleging that Carna Peterson was incompetent at the time of
the transaction, that she had received less than the full
consideration foe the pcoperty and that the respondents had
exercised undue influence over Carna Peterson.

On the 29th

of July, 1976, the State of Utah intecvened to protect its
interest in the property.
The trial court after a trial on the merits, ruled that
Carna Peterson understood the transaction and was not under
any undue influence or duress, but made no finding as to the
reasonablness of the consideration received by her or the
State of Utah.
ARGUMENT ON APPEAL
Appellants' contention on appeal is that the trial
court's findings are against the great weight of the evidence produced at trial.

This appeal seeks a review of the

trial record and a reversal of the tcial court's findings.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for-3digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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POHJT I
THIS COURT, SITTING Hl EQUITY, SfiOULD lcEVIE1! ~IJE COt!PLETE RECORD AND REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT IP ITS DECISION IS
AGAINST THE PREPONDERANCE OP THE EVIDENCE.
A suit to vacate the deed of an incompetent is a
classic exercise of the court's equity jurisdiction.
Am.Jur.2d Incompetent Persons §92 Et Seq.

41

See also Anderson

v. Thomas, 108 Utah 252, 159 P.2d 142 (1945).

As such, this

Court has both the duty and the prerogative to review the
law and the facts of the trial court and make its own find inc,
and substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.
Article VIII, Section 9, Constitution of Utah; Rule 72(a)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Mitchell v. Mitchell, 527
P.2d 1359 (Utah, 1974); and Baker v. Hatch, 70 Utah 1, 257
P. 673 (1927).
the record.

In effect, this court has a trial de novo on

Jensen v. Howell, 75 Utah 64, 282 P. 1034 (1929).

On such a review, if, after making due allowance for the
better opportunity of the trial court to observe the demeanm
of the witnesses, determining their credibility and weight
of their testimony, the Supreme Court is persuaded that the
findings of the trial court is against a fair preponderance
or greater weight of the evidence, then it should direct the
findings and remand the case for further proceedings.
Jensen, supra, and Burgess v. Colby, 93 Utah 103, 71 P.2d
185 (1937).

The test applied on such an equity review is

whether the trial court's findings are against the greater
weight of the evidence, or if the evidence clearly outweighs,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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or is inconsistent with, the trial court's finding.
~___s:_~~nincjham,

Wilson

24 Utah 167, 67 P. 118 (1901 •; and Paxton v.

Paxt_<:J_rl_, 80 Utah 540, 15 P.2d 1051 (1932).
POHlT J I
THE liCIGflT OF THE EVIDENCE IS CLEARLl' liGAINST THE TRIAL
COURT'S FHlDitiG THAT CARNA PETERSON UtTDCRSTOOD THE TRAilSACTION WITH THE RESPONDENTS.
a.

Applicable Test:

The test for determining whether a person had sufficient
mental capacity to contract was stated in O'Reilly v. McLean,
84 Utah 551, 37 P.2d 770,
from Hatch v. Hatch,

(1934), wherein the court quoting

46 Utah 218, 148 P. 433 (1915) adopted

the test stated in Teegarden v.

Lewis, l45

tnd. 98, 40 N.E.

1047, 44 N.E. 9, as follows:
In ordinary contracts the test is;
Were the mental facilities so deficient
or impaired that there was not sufficient
power to comprehend the subject of the contract, its nature and its probable consequences, and to act with discretion in
relation thereto, or with relation to the
ordinary affairs of life?
This has also been adopted as the test in determining whether
or not the grantor of a deed has sufficient mental capacity
to make the deed.

Anderson v. Thomas, supra.

In addition,

strict scrutiny of any transaction between an extremely aged
or severely ill person and others should be imposed by the
court reviewing the same.
opinion of Justice Turner).

Anderson, at 148.

(Concurring

See also Seequist v. Seequist,

524 P.2d 598 (1974).
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Of sane interest to the case presently before this
Court is Burgess v. Colby, supra.

There th0 court quoted

extensively from th2 record giving some guidance of the
factual analysis that needs to occur on appellate review.
For example, the Supreme Court determined in reviewing the
trial court's and jury's finding,

that independent witnesses

should be given more weight than those who have an interest
in the outcome.

Burgess, at 196.

that the ability to ".

The Court further stated

. talk about the affairs of the day,

of his travels, of the farm and its care, and to recognize
his friends when they called" were also important considerations, showing the mental state of a purported incompetent.
Burgess, at 196.
b.

Evidence Showing Incompetence.

The record is replete with testimony of the

incompeten~

of Carna Peterson and her inability to understand even the
ordinary affairs of life.

For example, she could not compr-

ehend when her property taxes were due,

(R. 30), or what

bills were paid or when they were due.

(R. 32).

She thought

that she had been in the rest home for four years when in
fact she had only been there one year and a half.

(R. 54).

She claimed that the rest home was trying to starve her and
that the family had not been to see her for four years' which
were both untrue.

(R. 35).

She would become confused about

the maintenance of her property including watering the
lawns.

(R. 35).

In fact, two witnesses even testified that

Carna Peterson suffered from hallucinations, that she though·

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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that her deceased husband was visiting her from time to
(P.

35, 60).

She often forgot when she had visitors

(P. 49) and didn't recognize people when they did visit her.
(R. 64).

She often rambled about past occurrences (R. 64)

and when she wrote letters, they suffered from the same lack
of understanding and coherence,

(R. 66), often being

addressed to the wrong individual.

(R. 117).

In addition to the testimony cited above by close
family and personal friends,

independent witnesses who had

no stake in the outcome of this matter also Lestified about
her inability to understand this type of financial transaction.

Her doctor, Dr. Steele, who had treated her for a

period of over twenty years stated:
I don't believe that she was conpetent
to handle abstruse financial affairs. She
was competent to handle her own personal
hygiene and social intercourse, but I
believe that her estimation of values, her
memory was going, and she was having
trouble in facing reality. She was confused at many intervals.
(R. 121).
Dr. Boston who had treated her since 1972, gave similar
testimony.

(R. 182-184).

Carna Peterson's nurse at the rest home stated that she
was incompetent to sign the deed and would not understand
the same.

(R. 128).

In fact, the assistant administrator

of the rest home testified in addition to her being unable
to handle financial matters, she was unable to care for her
own needs much of the time.

(R. 117).

Probably the most persuasive testimony of Carna Peterson's
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-7Library Services and Technology
Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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inability to understand the trunsaction she entered into
came from her own lips:
Q.
Did you sell your house?
sell your house?
A.

No, I didn't sell it.

Q.

What happened to it?

A.

Well, it just neaded.

Q.

Who needed it?

Did you

(sic)

A.
Somebody that produce two keys could
produce one.
Q.
Did you sell your house? Do you remember whether you sold your house? Did
you sell your house to anybody?

A.

I did not sell my home.

Q.

Did you give it away?

A.

No, I did not give it away.

Q.

What did you do with it?

A.
I talked with them, and they thought
it would be the best for them to be the
owner of my home.
Q. Who was going to be the owner of your
home, your family? Did you give your
home to your family?
A.
No.
They didn't ask anybody.
didn't even ask me.

They

Q. Well, who has your house:
Who took
your house from you? Who has it? Does
anybody?
A.

Nobody has it, but they are renting.

Q.

I see.

A.
Divide it up among the family.
And
my daughter and a boy Dale has charge of
that.
(R. 23-24).
On other occasions she thought she got $10,000.00 for the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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property (Ex. l; P. 50, 70).
This testimony is especially i~portant in light of the
uncontroverted testimony of three witnesses that there had
been very little if any deterioration in her mental state
from the time of the transaction to the ti~e of her testimany in court.

(R. 57, 119, 129).

Finally, Don Gowers, who was the only other person who
testified who was present at the execution of the deed
except Milton Harmon and the respondents, testified under
oath that he left and would have nothing further to do with
the transaction because he thought she was incapable of
understanding the transaction,

(R. 133), and her

should be notified before it was consummated.

fa~ily

(R.

133).

Juxtaposed against this testimony is that of the respondents' witnesses concerning Carna Peterson's competency.
For example, the respondents put Lucille Shepherd on the
stand to testify.

When asked for her opinion concerning

Mrs. Peterson's competency, however, she merely answered
that Carna Peterson was a determined woman, never really
addressing the issue of her competency.

( R. 16 4) •

Again,

when the respondents put Enid Worwood on the stand she
testified that Carna Peterson knew who Mrs. Worwood was when
she visited with her, but when asked if she was capable of
handling a transaction involving the sale of her house, Mrs.
Worwood had to admit:
Well, I really couldn't say other than
I could tell you that she talked to us,
she knew people that we knew, she asked
about people.
(R. 206).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The nemorandum decision of the lower court based its
findings of Carna Peterson's competence pr iJ~iH i ly on the
testimony of ~lil ton Harmon.

!lis testir:1ony is inconsequentia_

in comparison to that of the other witnesses.
short limited contact

He had only

2

with Carna Peterson on two occasions

t

(R. 87, 97, 134) and was not personally acquainted with her
prior to the dates of the transaction.

(R. 96, 97).

In

fact, he judged her to be in her late seventies or early
eighties when in fact she was much older.

( R.

9 6) •

at the respondents request (R. 76) and did not have

He came
suffici~

time to ascertain the aberrational character of nrs. Petersor
When asked about her ability to understand the transaction,
he admitted that he really could not testify about that, but
that she appeared to be a "pleasant, bright, alert lady."
(R. 97).

If he had known about her incompetency,

presumed~,

he would not have proceeded with the transaction since to

&

so would have been a breach of the ethical standards of the
legal profession.

Were he to testify in any other manner,

it would be an admission to unethical conduct.

Due to the

short time he was with her, however, he was unable to ascertain her competency to the same degree that others had, such
as her doctors and nurses, who had seen her for more

exteM~

periods of time.
c.

Argument.

The record is clear that Carna Peterson was unable to
understand the transaction she entered into with the respondents.

She was 91 years old and was living in a rest home

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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1

du~ to her inability to take care of herself at the time of

thP transaction.

The evidence is thus clearly against the

trial court's finding that Carna Peterson understood the
transaction she entered into with the respondents.
POINT III
THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IS CLEARLY AGAINST THE TRIAL
COURT'S FINDING THAT NO UNDUE INFLUENCE WAS EXERTED O~R
CARNA PETERSON.
a.

Undue Influence.

When determining whether a conveyance was procurred by
duress and undue influence, the state of the subject's
health of body should be cons1dered as bear 'ng on his will
to resist and the likelihood of it being overcome.
v. Johnson,

9 Utah 2d 40, 337 P.2d 420 (1959).

Johnson

As stated on

several occasions by this Court:
The condition of a man's mind is hut
shown by specific examples of his conduct.
Johnson, supra at 423.
The aberrational actions of Carna Peterson were clearly
set out in the record as discussed in Point II of this
brief.

Added to this is the rule adopted by most courts

that whenever there is great weakness of mind in a grantor
arising from age, though not necessarily amounting to total
insanity, if the consideration given for the property is
grossly inadequate, the court of equity will infer undue
influence and set such conveyances aside.

Buchmayer v. Buchmayer,

68 Cal.2d 462, 157 P.2d 9 (1945); Morgan v. Thompson, 46
N.M.

282, 127 P.2d 1037 (1942); and Davis v. Hulburt, 242
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P . 2d 78 4 ,

l 9 4 Or .

58 4 ( l 9 52 ) .

C. f .

'·'a l/<:~~0~ Trust

Company v. Walker, 17 Utah 2d 390, 112 P.2d 920 (1966).
The weight of the testimony clearly shows that the
value given for the property 1vas grossly inadequate.

Ted

Garfield, a qualified appraiser testified that the property
was worth $11,800.

(R. 105).

'l'he responciE:nt's bank apprais;

testified that the appraised value was $12,000 to $14,000,
(R. 126) before any improvements were made (R. 125) and they
did in fact make a loan of $6,000 to the respondents on the
hor:1e.

(R. 114).

Another bank appraiser was called by the

respondents who testified that the home was worth only

$6,000.

(R.

229).

He, however, admitted that he did not

make any conparables for the area of the property,

(R. 227),

did not have any other dealings in that area (228), and
there was a real question concerning his qualifications as
an expert.

( R.

229).

A lay appraiser of the respondents testified that the
property was worth close to what the respondents paid for
it, but he admitted that he had little or no experience, (R,

217, 223-224), and that he estimated the acre of ground to
be worth $500 and the house $2,500 in 1975.

( R. 218).

There was also evidence that the witness signed his appraisi
letter (Ex.

9) at the request of the respondents whc pre-

pared the same.
b.

(R. 154-155).

Confidential Relationship.

This Court has ruled on many occasions concerning
Sponsored
by the S.J. Quinney Lawrelationships
Library. Funding for digitization
provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
confidential
that:
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,-12may contain errors.

.
. . when a ~onfidential relationship
1s shown to ex1st and a gift or conveyance
1s made to a party in a superior position
a presumption arises that the transaction'
was unfair.
This presu~ption has the
force of e~idence and will itself support
a f1nd1ng lf not overcome by countcrveiling
evidence."
Johnson supra at 422.
This Court has further held that for a confidential relationship to be found it

~ust

be shown that:

The relationship must be such as would
lead an ordinarily prudent person in the
management of his business affairs to
repose that degree of confidence in the
other party which largely resultc in the
substitution of the will of the latter for
that of the former in the material matters
involved in the transaction. The doctrine
of confidential relationship rests upon
the principle of inequality between the
parties, and implies a position of superiority occupied by one of the parties over
the other.
Mere confidence in one person
by another is not sufficient alone to constitute such a relationship. The confidence must be reposed by one under such
circumstances as to create a corresponding
duty, either legal or moral, upon the part
of the other to observe the confidence,
and it must result in a situation where as
a matter of fact there is superior influence on one side and dependence on the
other.
Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 16 Utah 2d
3 7 8, 4 0 l p. 2d 7l 0 ( 1 9 6 5) •
There is strong evidence of a confidential relationship
between the respondents and Carna Peterson,
mother was the

roo~ate

Their grand-

of Carna Peterson in the resthome.

(R. 54). Mrs. Peterson indicated her love, affection, and
trust for the respondents and their family.

(R. 26, 77).

The respondent's grandmother was a witness to the transaction and execution of the deed.

( R. 8 3 I

84) .

This I

coupled 11ith the facts that Carna Peterson was 91 years of
Sponsored
by the S.J.
Quinney Law Library. brought
Funding for digitization
by the Institute
of Museum
and Library
age,
the
respondents
the provided
attorney
with
them
to Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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complete the transaction,

(R. 76) anJ then threatened the

welfare agent not to contact the far7lily abo•1t the transaction ( R. 136), indicates the undue influence exerted on
Carna Peterson.

This is especially true in light of the

confidential relationship existing between the respondent's
grandmother and Mrs. Peterson which itself gives rise to a
presumption of undue influence.

Johnson, supra.

The record is clear and the testimony uncontroverted
that Carna Peterson was pliable and amenable to pressures of
people.

(R. 14).

As she herself testified, "they (the

respondents) thought it would be best for them to be the
owner of my home'', '(R. 24), and she didn't really want to
sell it to anyone.

( R.

25).

CONCLUSION
Upon a complete review of the record in this matter,
the Court should reverse the trial judge's findings that
Carna Peterson knew and understood the transaction she
entered into with the respondents.

The great weight of

evidence is against any other finding.

t~

In addition, the

weight of the evidence shows that this 91 year old lady
living in a rest home, was the victim of undue influence of
the respondents and that a confidential relationship
between the respondents grandmother and thus the
and Carna Peterson.

exist~

responden~

This Court should reverse the trial

court's findings on these issues and send this case back to
the trial court for further proceedings.
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